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Organizational redesign processes can take many forms from the simple 
implementation of an 'off-the-peg' standard solution to a 'carefully tailored' solution 
characterized by many iterations of experimentation, evaluation and collective 
reflection by various stakeholders. Two key contextual factors affecting such 
processes arc culture and decision-making authority. These variables are complex 
in themselves and their influence on the redesign process can be moderated by 
specific factors. This chapter presents a case which illustrates how efforts to 
accommodate collective reflection within an organizational redesign program were 
affected by organizational culture and centralized decision-making and how these 
effects were heightened by a 'secrecy factor'. 
One of the most promising topics to explore in contemporary knowledge-based 
organizations concerns productive reflection and learning that takes place during 
significant organization restructuring. Reflexive design incorporates aspects of 
action research, appreciative inquiry, socio-technical systems and self-design. It 
provides unique insights concerning the redesign process and the management of 
system wide change (Stebbins and Shani 2002). However, the extent to which 
reflexive design might be applied under extreme organizational conditions is 
unknown. This chapter investigates the limits of productive reflection and learning 
under conditions of secrecy. We will provide a brief overview of ideal reflexive 
design and then demonstrate significant gaps between theory and practice through 
the examination of the PrimeOptics case. Finally, we will provide observations 
about the case and implications for productive reflection in similar organizations. 
Organization design 
Relatively few theories provide comprehensive frameworks that can shed light on 
the chaotic process of redesign (Beer 200 l ). Design is thought to be a blend of 
theory, knowledge embedded in the particular industryI sector and work situation 
and the contributions of those who participate in the redesign process (Mackenzie 
1986). The process is both technical and political, and involves purposeful effort to 
design the organization as an integrated system. Moreover, design is treated as a 
complex task that aligns the people, resources and work. In today's environment, 
17ze limits of riflexive design 81 
the list of participants in redesign projects may include all key stakeholders, owners, 
personnel, customers and suppliers. However little is known about the impact of 
including or excluding specific stakeholders. !<or example how does the exclusion . 
of non-managerial employees affect redesign outcomes? Will the new design be 
less sustainable? In complex organizations, elaborate structural learning 
mechanisms arc often created to guide the change program and to foster sound 
communications, reflection and learning during all program phases (see for 
example, Chapter 9). In contrast, what are the helpful processes, and what are the 
outcomes of redesigning work when it is conducted by a few people having similar 
backgrounds, making decisions in secret? What are the appropriate types of 
involvement, dialogue and reflection, under conditions of secrecy in the change 
process? 
Reflexive design, reflection and learning 
Certain common values have emerged regarding idealized reflexive design. These 
values relate to the context for initiating change, the change process and the desired 
outcomes. For example, a strong value is dual emphasis on quality of work life and 
competitive organizational performance. Both are addressed throughout the change 
process through critical evaluation of new designs and their impacts on different 
stakeholders. Design is conceived as ·a riflexive methodology of intervention - a rype of 
enlightened, se!fcritical process that accepts diffirences in science and practice. By definition, 
reflexive design means to mirror or direct back the redesign work. Since the 
dictionary definitions are so similar, in this chapter we will freely use the words 
reflective and reflexive. Collective reflection is the abiliry to uncover and make explicit 
what was planned, observed, or achieved in practice; therrfore it is concerned with the reconstruction 
qf meaning and results in work-based learning (Raelin 2000). In the context of a change 
program, some new types of reflection and learning are evident. They might 
include: 
Participants explore vision and goals as well as alternative redesign frameworks. 
The stakeholders investigate and choose among redesign approaches that fit 
their unique situation (see Figure 7.1 ). 
Participants' self-apply theory, methods and practices. In keeping with self­
design values, organizational members take ownership of the change process 
through high involvement at all stages. In a spirit of inquiry, all parties including 
consultants consider both theory and practice, and deliberate on ways to link 
them. 
Participants arc encouraged to identify and explore the meanings and 
implications of possible dilemmas - for example that team-centred designs 
might suppress individual creativity. 
Design activities are iterative. Deliberations among stakeholders occur through­
out the process to assure that redesign produces the desired balanced outcomes. 
Self-design and learning from experience arc facilitated (Figure 7.1 ). 
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Figure 7.1 Reflective design: a conceptual roadmap 
Secrecy as an im.propitious culture and contextfor collective 
reflection 
As is illustrated in Chapters 8 and 9 in this volume, the constraints on redesign and 
learning can stem from the existing management, culture and organizational 
configuration. For example, organization theory suggests that a matrix organization 
carries a certain culture of openness, ongoing clash of perspectives, full use of 
knowledge worker talents and problem-solving on behalf of customers (Galbraith 
1994). However, a defense industry firm with a matrix structure may not have 
these characteristics (Landau 2003). Instead, secrecy and competitive pressures 
across defense contractors may lead the firm to adopt unique internal processes 
that do not encourage workplace learning and knowledge transfer beyond somewhat 
isolated work units (cf Schenkel, Chapter 6 in this volume). 
Secrecy is a contextual variable as well as a cultural variable. Organizational 
culture is usually defined in terms of persistent shared values and behavioural 
norms (e.g., Mitroff and Kilmann 1984). Aspects of the culture (e.g. secrecy, in 
terms of doing business on a 'need-to-know' basis) are likely to conflict with 
principles of ideal reflexive design. We need to explore how learning in general 
and productive reflection in particular are advanced under a culture that emphasizes 
secrecy. 
Vision, goals and criteria 
Reflexive design theory advocates local control of design processes and high 
participant involvement in the creation of goals and design criteria. Thus this 
approach is more of a bottom-up approach to change. The question of how goals 
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and design criteria are developed during redesign programs is an interesting issue, 
especially under conditions of secrecy. Design criteria are statements that describe, 
in ideal terms, what the organization design should accomplish. Design criteria 
usually have an action verb; they state that the design should facilitate, promote, 
encourage, providefor, or motivate (Nadler and Tushman 1988). Design criteria reflect 
the values of the different stakeholders and are written in response to competitive 
conditions, the tasks to be executed, the collective sense of current problems and 
perceived cause of problems, and other constraints. Design criteria drive the entire 
decision-making process and provide links to strategy, technology integration and 
the development process that occurs in design cycles. The advantages and limits 
of design criteria are explored in the case to follow. 
Collaborative design 
The design process must consider individual and team capacity to cope with a 
changing work. One of the most compelling ~spects of reflexive design is the 
emphasis on personal support to employees and learning. Successful redesign work 
requires the active involvement of those who must live with the changes as well as 
social support mechanisms (Shani and Docherty 2003). During operational 
redesign, individual experimentation takes place within the context of group work 
and inter-group relationships. Accordingly, reflexive design can be characterized 
as 'collaborative design', entailing collaboration among members of the units 
directly concerned and also among concerned stakeholders. 
Collective reflection 
Reflexive design processes must provide space and time for learning and developing 
competence in work. This includes providing forums for structured deliberation 
within the normal project stages as well as time for spontaneous and unplanned 
learning and reflection. The process of change centres on the knowledge and 
experience of those who are closest to the work at hand. Learning, coping capacity 
and other individual competencies support people as they experiment with new 
roles, relationships and work activities (Raelin 2000). Successful transformation 
depends upon effort, individual capabilities and sound facilitation of the overall 
reflexive design process. The above characteristics are associated with the ideal 
process of reflexive design. The redesign process led by managers of PrimeOptics 
is captured next. It is used here to highlight aspects of good reflexive design as well as 
majorflaws that do not promote productive reflection and learning. 
The PrimeOptics case 
PrimeOptics is a division of one of the largest defense and aerospace systems 
contractors in the United States. With billions of dollars in annual sales this defense 
contractor employs many thousands of employees worldwide. The company is 
known for its high standards of technological innovation and customer relations, 
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as well as for its relatively low employee turnover rates. Despite these positive 
factors, at the outset of the case the PrimcOptics division suffered from declining 
sales and a lower market share. A customer survey conducted in early 2002 indicated 
that PrimeOptics was not considered cost-competitive. 'We love your technology; 
it's needed to save lives; we wish we could afford it' was the typical response from 
PrimeOptics' customers. 
PrimeOptics devoted considerable resources to customer relations and respon­
siveness. It had strong program management offices for customer interfaces and a 
full spectrum of engineering personnel assigned to the various programs. Each 
program was responsible for a family of technologically related products, 
throughout their life cycles. Due to the secretive nature of the industry, programs 
were developed for specific customers. Program autonomy and internal company 
barriers led to non-uniform production and business processes. As a result, the 
company was often too slow and expensive in moving from prototypes to efficient 
manufacturing. 
To address the perceived threat to the company success and survival, an overall 
change program was designed, aimed at reducing cycle times, reducing cost of 
engineering support, improving the transition from product development work to 
production work, and positioning the company to compete in new markets. To 
accomplish this, six taskforces were created, one of which is focused here - the 
Production Execution group. The group's task was to restructure production 
operations and to significantly reduce manufacturing costs. It was expected that 
financial and productivity gains would come through a reorganization of 
engineering support groups and a breaking up of the PrimeOptics matrix 
organization. The explicit intent was to cut engineering support costs by 50%. 
PrimeOptics had an embedded matrix structure (see Figure 7 .2), in which the 
engineering support groups reported to both production and program management. 
There were certain inefficiencies associated with having dozens of mutually 
exclusive programs. For example, there were problems connected with allocating 
engineering staff in periods of peak and low demands. But PrimeOptics had not 
developed cross-program managerial processes to address these and other issues. 
The PrimeOptics organization seemed to have all the problems and very few of 
the benefits normally associated with matrix structures. 
Staffing the taskforce 
The vision for the change program called for a shift in decision-making authority 
and control from program offices to the factories. Accordingly, management staffed 
the production execution taskforce with factory managers and supervisors, and 
excluded program offices and engineering support personnel. It was very evident 
from the taskforce stafling that management did not want to save the matrix. While 
most of the managers on the taskforce were former engineers, only two of the I 0 
taskforce members had program office or customer contact experience from prior 
jobs. Due to the organizational culture, participation in the taskforce was secret 
and few people outside the taskfcJrce knew that it existed or what it was doing. 
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Figure 7.2 Organization chart with embedded matrix structure 
Time line 
The taskforce was created in February 2002. Since some taskforce members were 
aware of organization designs in other divisions of the company, they used their 
contacts to investigate design innovations that might be adapted to the PrimeOptics 
situation. They identified six manufacturing designs that were thought to be 
successful elsewhere and seemed to match the vision. They then began to elaborate 
them and provide definitions that would allow comparisons. The taskforce met 
biweekly, and conducted data gathering between sessions. Ref1ecting on this phase 
of the taskforce work, team members later observed that the pace was almost 
frantic, even though they worked to a self-imposed deadline. The taskforce proposed 
a new strategic design in june 2002. However, after this point there were many 
delays in feedback and directives from management and taskforce members became 
impatient with the lack of action. The management decision was announced in 
November, and the cutover to the new design began in january 2003. 
The researchers' role 
In late March 2002 the taskforce leader brought in a team of two university 
researchers to assist the taskforce and to provide independent opinions and 
information on 'state-of-the-art' practice. One researcher was an expert on industrial 
engineering, and the other was an expert on organization design. The researchers 
began their work by linking the taskforce deliberations to alternative design theories 
including reflective design. The idea was to place the taskforce work into a larger 
perspective so that the group could consider a wider and more robust set of options. 
For example, the researchers felt that work in progress most closely matched the 
Nadler and 1 ushman (1988) redesign process. They guided the group through the 
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various steps in the Nadler and Tushman process to educate members on 
comprehensive design and to allow some critique and reflection on what had been 
accomplished and what had not been accomplished. This type of comparison and 
discussion among consultants and clients is a key feature of reflective design. 
The researchers also helped the group identify issues that would have to be 
addressed in the coming design and development stages. They provided the platform 
for the taskforce leaders' reflection about both the design process and substantive 
issues, and provided their own expert assessment. They also encouraged manage­
ment to bring in more stakeholders, but this advice was not acted on. Consistent 
with PrimeOptics culture and values, managers stated that the project was kept 
secret 'to allow the taskforce maximum freedom in generating alternative designs, 
and to avoid rumors'. Accordingly, most other PrimeOptics managers, supervisors 
and employees remained in the dark on the redesign process both before and after 
recommendations were made. 
The organization design process performed by the taskforce 
During the period from late March to May, the taskforce developed six alternative 
organizational designs. The researchers were unable to participate in all the face­
to-face discussions due to distance and time limitations. But they were able to 
bombard the group with questions via phone calls and email messages. Based on 
the desired future capabilities, the taskforce developed a list of l 0 criteria that 
could be used to evaluate the six options. It is noteworthy that design criteria were 
created by the taskforce members in relative isolation. 
The researchers pointed out that 'people issues' were seldom directly included 
in construction of criteria. For example, the 'ability of designs to promote career 
paths' criterion was assigned a 3.4% decision weight. The taskforcc norm was to 
avoid people and emotional considerations in favour of criteria that emphasized 
costs and technical solutions. The PrimeOptics culture, values and norms stressed 
engineering objectivity. After the project was completed, several members indicated 
that this inhibited frank discussion. On reflection, they indicated that structures 
were being created that would benefit specific members of the taskforce, but that 
this was deliberately not discussed during meetings. Team members could clearly 
sec their potential new roles in the different options being considered but did not 
discuss their personal likes and dislikes 'in order to stay objective'. 
By the time that the taskforce began deliberations on the best choices, the 
researchers were again on the scene. Consistent with the original objectives, the 
group focused on two alternative designs that decentralized engineering and 
program office activities to the factory, breaking up the matrix. At this critical 
stage the researchers raised several issues for collective reflection: 
Arc the leading alternatives significantly different fi·om each other? 
• Would either of the models facilitate the expressed needs of other taskforces? 
• How would the models perform under scrutiny of other stakeholders? 
How risky are these models to the company's main strengths · innovation 
and customer responsiveness? 
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The taskforce members welcomed these points being raised, but they did not feel 
that time or additional resources could be spent on questions raised by the 
researchers. Keeping a self-imposed deadline for presenting their final design 
seemed ~ore important than following a reflexive design process that might take 
several more weeks of work. Instead, taskforce members combined the best elements 
of the two models and submitted one design to top management. 
Top management took four months to design their own solution retaining key 
features of the matrix organization (Figure 7 .3). This was surprising to all parties 
given the initial overwhelming management sentiment against the matrix. The 
taskforce leader was especially shocked because he had informal contacts with 
other taskforces and was not at all aware of top management intentions. He felt 
that the redesign was significant in the sense of new factory authority over certain 
engineering support groups, but he did not understand why other elements of the 
proposed design were rejected. The matrix would be retained, with little hope for 
achieving major cost reductions. Much of the past sense of urgency and crisis 
faded away. With a return to company profitability, top management expected to 
make few cuts in staffing. 
Injanuary 2003 the taskforce leaders and researchers took stock of the situation. 
It was apparent that top management had abandoned the vision, values and 
rationale behind the change program. Taskforce members did not know why the 
new design was selected or how it might be justified. That is, without the crisis of 
high support costs and need fi)r downsizing, what would management and the 
taskforce members communicate to the workforce as the reason behind the 
significant changes in organization design? 
The transition process and dynamics 
The researchers, hoping to broaden participation and to foster a spirit of reflection 
and learning, proposed an elaborate structural learning mechanism. This 
mechanism would tightly link in human resources, training, information systems 
and other support services commonly required in the cutover to new designs (see 
Chapters 8 and 9). However, the newly appointed production executive chose 
instead a simple implementation group of four sub-team leaders (all managers) 
and an overall transition team leader. Since some of the newly appointed transition 
team members had not been involved in the prior process, the group took time to 
revisit earlier taskforcc decisions. With a better understanding of past options 
considered as well as top management's strategic design, the group began to alter 
the operational design of the factories. This activity was 'design on the fly'. New 
work emerged from collective reflection on the current situation and experiences, 
a feature of reflexive design. The transition group had freedom to redesign work 
on the shop f1oor, and selectively began to involve work teams in experimentation 
with new work methods and production processes. Compared to the prior taskforce 
the team did not have to worry about approvals as it had authority to put changes 
in place immediately. The researchers observed that this type of collaboration and 
involvement with employees had seldom been seen earlier in the change program. 
As the transition team conducted its work, they encountered some obstacles to 
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Figure 7.3 New modified matrix following redesign 
innovation and efficiency. The transition team felt that the new design could not 
achieve full potential until dedicated engineering staff members were physically 
co-located in the factories. However, there simply was not enough space in the 
factories for engineering staff, and the transition team had to alter this important 
aspect of the operational design. 
Discussion 
Reflections on the case and the scope of the redesign process 
Reflexive design theory is a useful framework for analysis of the PrimeOptics case. 
According to theory, the quality of deliberations and discussion at all stages of 
redesign work is crucial to achievement of balanced results. Moreover, the reflexive 
design approach calls for high involvement from all parties and self-application of 
theory, methods and practices. In the PrimeOptics case, important stakeholders 
were left out from the start. This had serious implications for the construction of 
the vision and goals, self-design activities, the scope and time for reflective learning, 
and managerial capacity to adopt a systemic view of outcomes. In the larger change 
program, learning and reflection were not perceived as important elements in the 
change process. Leaders and members of the various taskforces did not regularly 
meet to share progress and discuss problems, and were not aware of potential 
impacts of their own activities on others. The top manager kept abreast of taskforce 
activities but missed opportunities for synergy and reflective learning at all 
management and employee levels. Thus the various taskforces had a restricted 
view of the internal environment and shifting priorities. This was demonstrated 
most dramatically by the rejection of the production execution taskforce 
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recommendations. Top management decided not to cut engineering support costs 
by 50%, and decided to retain basic elements of the matrix organization. Overall, 
the decision-making was top-down, except for the generation of taskforce 
recommendations. Lack of dialogue up and down the hierarchy seriously limited 
productive reflection, learning and commitment to the strategic design. 
At the taskforce level, conditions were much better. Considering our earlier list 
of new types of reflection and learning (see 'Reflexive design, reflection and 
learning', p. 31 ), some aspects of reflexive design were handled quite well. Task­
force participants explored goals, alternative redesign models and developed design 
criteria. The group clearly adopted an approach in agreement with PrimeOptics' 
unique culture and situation. Taskforce members were able to self-apply theory, 
methods and practices and assumed strong ownership of the change process. 
However, they also set unrealistic deadlines and sacrificed opportunities for collective 
reflection to meet self-imposed project milestones. Management and the taskforce 
did not regard design work as iterative, or that it should receive attention beyond 
the rather 'closed' taskforce membership. The redesign taskforce did not check 
their work with top management or any other group and thus left themselves open 
for criticism and the eventual surprise of seeing their suggestion replaced by a new 
design passed down from top management. 
It is noteworthy that the taskforce simply passed on its recommendations, and 
did not seriously engage in discussions with top management. This continued the 
group's pattern of avoiding conflict, discussions of differences and consideration 
of emotional or non-technical issues. In retrospect, taskforce members reflected 
that a great deal of time was wasted on development of design criteria, quantitative 
ratings of the alternative designs, and merging the two leading models. These 
considerations had little to do with the design created by top management. They 
felt that the time might have been devoted to conversations with the top manager 
so that the final strategic design could reflect their knowledge of conditions in the 
factory and how the design might be implemented. Both the PrimeOptics culture 
and locus of decision making seemed to block meaningful dialogue. 
Reflective design processes include time for learning and development of new 
competencies. This includes deliberations within normal project stages as well as 
time for spontaneous and unplanned learning and reflection (Stebbins and Shani 
2002). This is especially important as redesign shifts toward implementation and 
people need support experimenting with new roles, relationships and work activities. 
As noted in the case, management did not see the need to create a transition 
support infrastructure that would support experimentation, training and learning 
at operating levels. Implementation was left to a small management team. 
Production process changes were initiated with selected work teams, and the 
implementation group modified the strategic design to account for various obstacles 
and factory realities. These initiatives produced the kinds of collaborative design, 
productive reflection and learning that researchers hoped to see during the overall 
program. 
Reflexive design authors and consultants promote a systemic view of values­
based outcomes. Dual emphasis on quality of work life and competitive organiz­
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ational performance is a core value (Docherty et al. 2002). PrimeOptics, however, 
rarely considered the intellectual, emotional or physical needs of employees as it 
established a vision and goals, conducted self-design activities and implemented 
the riew design. Low involvement of employees, customers and other stakeholders 
led to myopia, sub-optimization and considerable wasted effort during the strategic 
design stages. In this respect, the PrimeOptics case is an example of how not to 
carry out reflexive design. 
Reflective practice during redesign 
Reflexive design theory is in part based on Self-Design thinking (Mohrman and 
Cummings 1989; Weick 1977) and it is a design process characterized by multiple 
iterations. As different stakeholders enter the picture, goals, design criteria and 
new designs are subjected to continuous scrutiny and modification. Design work 
often cycles back to earlier stages, incorporating new values, ideas and information. 
This occurred when the researchers entered the picture and led a comprehensive 
review of design approaches and ideal theory compared to taskforce activities. It 
also occurred later, as the new transition team members studied earlier design 
work and made operational design changes at implementation. Despite these limited 
connections to reflexive design theory, it can be concluded that the PrimeOptics 
redesign process had serious flaws in leaving out the principal stakeholder, top 
management. It is not clear that additional redesign cycles involving other 
stakeholders would have been productive, since management rejected most ideas 
proposed by the taskforce. There was time available for productive reflection and 
learning with other stakeholders, but the real opportunity existed between the 
taskforce and top management. 
In the absence of sound structural learning mechanisms to stimulate new 
conversations, what can be tried to trigger learning in a secrecy-based organization? 
The case suggests that researchers/consultants can create ad hoc or temporary 
forums, different from the client's typical style of running meetings and conducting 
the design process. This was accomplished when the researchers presented and 
led discussions about alternative design theories, and when they asked difficult 
questions about the value of proposed designs. Therefore, educational interventions 
and expert consulting, if co-operatively sponsored by both researchers and clients, 
show high promise for stimulating productive reflection and learning in secretive 
organizations. 
Reflective design under secrecy conditions 
We viewed secrecy as both a contextual and organization culture variable. The 
challenges encountered in the effort reported in this chapter were magnified by 
the embedded phenomenon of secrecy or the 'need-to-know' culture. As we said 
earlier, collective reflection is the ability to uncover and make explicit what one 
has planned, observed or achieved in practice··- therefore it is concerned with the 
creation of collective meaning. Thus, by its very nature, ref1exive design 
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requirements emphasize the need for high involvement of all the stakeholders in 
the reflection process, in the exploration of alternative solutions and in the creation 
of shared meaning. Thus 'secretive' culture significantly limits the ability to fully 
engage in reflective or reflexive design. 
\,Ye discovered in this study that the challenge is even greater when the secrecy­
based culture is coupled with an organizational configuration that is more like 
machine bureaucracy than adhocracy or matrix. PrimeOptics relied on the 
hierarchy to get things done and did not have many of the characteristics associated 
with matrix culture and problem-solving processes. Many limits to productive 
reflection and learning were identified and addressed in this chapter. We observed 
low involvement of employees and other stakeholders in decision making and 
restricted communications between sub-units and levels. The organization as a 
whole was not used to experimenting with opposite ways of relating and working. 
However, on a local level, the taskforce manager took steps to open up the redesign 
process by welcoming outside researchers and modifying deliberations when 
researchers were present. Some reflexive design was possible at the taskforce level 
in this secrecy-based company, even without an umbrella of support from top 
management. We can conclude from our case example that advancement of 
reflexive design in a secrecy-based organization requires greater involvement of 
top managers and other stakeholders in the process and willingness to explore 
both technical and social considerations during redesign. 
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